In warfare, an amphibious operation uses naval ships to land ground assets on a hostile shore at a designated landing site.
Conventional amphibious operations will now be described with reference to FIGS. 1-6B.
FIG. 1 illustrates a conventional warship 102 loaded with amphibious assault assets for transport to a target landing coastline. As shown in the figure, conventional warship 102 includes: a plurality of combat rubber reconnaissance crafts (CRRCs), a sample of which is indicated as CRRC 104; a plurality of landing craft mechanized (LCM6) vehicles, a sample of which is indicated as LCM6 106 and a plurality of assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs), a sample of which is indicated as AAV 108.
A CRRC is a rubber inflatable boat used by the U.S. military that can carry a maximum of 10 passengers with a maximum payload (including fuel) of 2,756 lb. The speed and range of a CRRC is based on payload, but are about a maximum speed of 21 mph and a general operation range of about 12 miles. A LCM6 or “Mike Boat” is a landing craft designed for carrying vehicles that came to prominence during WWII. An LCM6 can carry about 50 tons of cargo has an operating speed of about 10 mph and a range of about 130 miles.
An AAV is the current amphibious troop transport for the US Marine Corps. An AAV has the capability to transition from water to ground operations without tactical pause. These vehicles typically self-deploy from an amphibious assault ship and can travel about 4-6 miles per hour in the water. There are approximately 700 AAV currently in operation. These current AAVs are being steadily phased-out with an upgraded AAV, wherein the upgraded AAVs have a 20 mile operational range and can travel 8 mph in the water. The AAV will soon be replaced with an upgraded Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV).
Returning to FIG. 1, to launch the amphibious assault assets, a door 110 is opened at the stern of ship 102. Each amphibious vehicle is then launched out of the ship into water in order to transport to shore.
FIG. 2 illustrates a plurality of conventional amphibious landing crafts on the shore of a target landing coastline.
As shown in the figure, water 200 meets beach 202. A plurality of amphibious landing craft, a sample of which are indicated as landing craft 204 and CRRC 206 have transported through water 200 to land at beach 202. Further, some of the amphibious landing craft have unloaded land-based vehicles, a sample of which is indicated as tank 208.
FIG. 3 illustrates an example conventional landing craft air cushion (LCAC) amphibious vehicle 302 unloading a tank 304 onto the shore 306 of a target landing site.
As shown in the figure LCAC amphibious vehicle 302 includes a skirt 308 and a starboard ramp 310. LCAC amphibious vehicle 302 can carry about 70 tons at a sustained speed of about 40 mph over water having waves averaging 6 feet for about 200 miles. LCAC amphibious vehicle 302 provides the capability to launch an amphibious assault from up to 50 miles offshore. LCAC amphibious vehicle 302 can easily deploy from an amphibious warship, travel over water and continue onto land without pause. However, a major detriment to such an amphibious assault vehicle is drawn to the actual landing and unloading. To unload a payload, e.g., tanks, vehicles and men, LCAC amphibious vehicle 302 requires about 500 yards to stop, wherein it then needs to deflate the air cushion provided by skirt 308. At this point, LCAC amphibious vehicle 302 becomes a very large, non-moving target. For this reason, LCAC amphibious vehicle 302 is limited in its scope of operation. Accordingly AAVs have a much larger role in amphibious landings.
FIG. 4A illustrates an example conventional AAV 402 traveling through water toward the shore of a target landing site. FIG. 4B illustrates AAV 402 arriving at the shore of the target landing site. FIG. 4C illustrates AAV 402 on land.
Warship 102 may launch an amphibious assault onto a hostile beach with a combination of amphibious landing vehicles. This will be described with greater detail with reference to FIGS. 5-6B.
FIG. 5 illustrates an example conventional amphibious assault in a littoral battlespace. FIG. 5 includes a body of water 502, land 504, warship 102 and AAV 108.
Body of water 502 meets land 504 along a coast 506. Body of water 502 includes an out-of-range area 508 and an in-range area 510. Out-of-range area 508 is separated from in-range area 510 by a demarcation line 512.
As shown in the figure, warship 102 is located in water 502 off coast 506. For purposes of discussion, let out-of-range area 508 be considered a safe area for warship 102, whereas in-range area 510 is an unsafe area, such that demarcation line 512 generally marks a unsafe threshold toward coast 506. In particular, presume that the military strategists in charge of this assault have determined that demarcation line 512 is a sufficient distance as to be over the horizon (OTH) or sufficiently out of range of land-based rockets, which may damage or even sink slow moving warship 102. For purposes of discussion, let demarcation line 512 be 100 miles off coast 506.
In particular, the proliferation of low-cost, extended-range, land-based rockets is pushing demarcation line 512 from 50 miles off coast 506, to 66 miles or even now—100 miles off coast 506. For purposes of discussion, let demarcation line 512 be 100 miles off coast 506.
In this example, warship 102 is located at position 514 within in-range area 510. As such, warship 102 is either not OTH or is in range of land-based rockets. Therefore, slow moving warship 102 is at risk of damage. Further, for purposes of discussion, let the mission of warship 102 specify an amphibious landing by AAV 108 at a landing site 518 of coast 506.
As mentioned above. AAV 108 has an operation range of about 20 miles. Therefore, position 514 should be within 20 miles of coast 506. This is in relative terms, extremely close for land-based rockets and puts warship 102 at great risk. Furthermore, as mentioned above, AAV 108 has a max speed of about 8 mph. Accordingly, to travel 20 miles, AAV 108 will have to travel for about 2.5 hours from warship 102 at position 514 to landing site 518. Warship 102 may stay at position 514 to provide support for AAV 108 while it travels to landing site 518 and thus increase the chances of taking damage from land-based rockets. Alternatively, warship 102 may abandon AAV 108 after deployment and sail past demarcation line 512 to out-of-range area 508, thus increasing its safety while leaving AAV 108 without support. Either situation is not desirable.
Consider the situation where a CRRC is deployed from warship 102 at location 514. As mentioned above, a CRRC has an operating speed of about 21 mph and typically has an operating range of about 12 miles. However, for purposes of discussion, in this example a CRRC is used outside of the normal operating range—about 20 miles as deployed from location 514. Accordingly, to travel 20 miles, a CRRC will have to travel for about 1 hour from warship 102 at position 514 to landing site 518. Again, warship 102 may either stay at position 514 to provide support for the CRRC while it travels to landing site 518 and thus increase the chances of taking damage from land-based rockets, or warship 102 may abandon the CRRC after deployment and sail past demarcation line 512 to out-of-range area 508, thus increasing its safety while leaving the CRRC without support. Either situation is not desirable.
To avoid the problematic situations discussed above, consider another conventional amphibious assault wherein warship 102 deploys amphibious assets beyond demarcation line 512. This will be described with reference to FIGS. 6A-B.
FIG. 6A illustrates another example conventional amphibious assault using AAV 108 in a littoral battlespace. Like the example of FIG. 5, FIG. 6A includes body of water 502, land 504, warship 102 and AAV 108.
In this example, warship 102 is located at position 602 within out-of-range area 508. As such, warship 102 is OTH and has a decreased chance of taking damage from land-based rockets. Further, for purposes of discussion, let the mission of warship 102 still specify an amphibious landing by AAV 108 at landing site 518 of coast 506.
As mentioned above, AAV 108 has an operation range of about 20 miles. In this example, as warship 102 is beyond demarcation line 512, warship 102 is well beyond 100 miles from landing site 518. Therefore, if deployed from warship 102 at position 602, AAV 108 would not reach landing site 518. On the contrary, AAV would only make it to point 604 within in-range area 510. Such a situation is not desirable. To avoid a stranded-at-sea AAV 108 situation, an LCM6 might be utilized for an amphibious assault from warship 102 at location 602. This will be described with reference to FIG. 6B.
FIG. 6B illustrates another example conventional amphibious assault using LCM6 106 in a littoral battlespace. Like the example of FIG. 5, FIG. 6B includes body of water 502, land 504, warship 102 and LCM6 106.
In this example, warship 102 is located at position 602 within out-of-range area 508. As such, warship 102 is OTH and has a decreased chance of taking damage from land-based rockets. Further, for purposes of discussion, let the mission of warship 102 still specify an amphibious landing by LCM6 106 at landing site 518 of coast 506.
As mentioned above, LCM6 106 has a typical operation range of about 20 miles, but a total range of about 130 miles. As further mentioned above, an LCM6 has an operating speed of about 10 mph. Accordingly, warship could deploy LCM6 106 from past demarcation line 512. However, at 100 miles from shore 506, traveling at 10 mph, it would take LCM6 106 10 hours to reach landing site 518. Such a long arrival time is not desirable.
A Ship to Shore Maneuver Exploration and Experimentation Task Force (S2ME2 TF) was commissioned in August 2015 to develop concepts and conduct prototype experiments and demonstrations to investigate new operational and technical capabilities that enable expeditionary teams to achieve their objectives. A S2ME2 TF fleet engagement team conference of November 2016 provides a special notice that includes a Concept of Operations (CONOP). The CONOP includes a discussion as follows:                “A national Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) conducts an amphibious assault against a peer adversary, with a focus on surface assault and inland maneuver. The Amphibious Force maneuvers at range to minimize impact of threat intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and weapons while conducting shaping operations to establish conditions for the landing. As conditions are established that negate enemy long range missiles, the amphibious force will project power ashore via strikes, raids, and other maneuvers in support of the establishment of sea control, the further reduction of enemy threats, and to secure entry points. Marines will conduct raids and strike missions from extended ranges (18-100 miles) to reduce the enemy's threats within the littoral battlespace, raise enemy signatures for subsequent targeting; and secure entry points.”        
Land-based rockets in the littoral battle space are increasing range such that a line a demarcation for safety of a warship is pushing 100 miles off coast. However, there is no current viable amphibious landing system that is able to quickly deliver assets from a warship that is 100 miles off coast to a landing site.
Accordingly, for at least the foregoing reasons there exists a need for an amphibious landing system and method that is able to quickly deliver assets from a warship that is 100 miles off coast to a landing site.